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Future population growth is uncertain and matters for climate
policy: higher growth entails more emissions and means more
people will be vulnerable to climate-related impacts. We show
that how future population is valued importantly determines mit-
igation decisions. Using the Dynamic Integrated Climate-Economy
model, we explore two approaches to valuing population: a dis-
counted version of total utilitarianism (TU), which considers total
wellbeing and is standard in social cost of carbon dioxide (SCC)
models, and of average utilitarianism (AU), which ignores popu-
lation size and sums only each time period’s discounted average
wellbeing. Under both approaches, as population increases the
SCC increases, but optimal peak temperature decreases. The effect
is larger under TU, because it responds to the fact that a larger
population means climate change hurts more people: for exam-
ple, in 2025, assuming the United Nations (UN)-high rather than
UN-low population scenario entails an increase in the SCC of 85%
under TU vs. 5% under AU. The difference in the SCC between the
two population scenarios under TU is comparable to commonly
debated decisions regarding time discounting. Additionally, we
estimate the avoided mitigation costs implied by plausible reduc-
tions in population growth, finding that large near-term savings
($billions annually) occur under TU; savings under AU emerge in
the more distant future. These savings are larger than spending
shortfalls for human development policies that may lower fertil-
ity. Finally, we show that whether lowering population growth
entails overall improvements in wellbeing—rather than merely
cost savings—again depends on the ethical approach to valuing
population.
population | climate change | social cost of carbon | social welfare |
emissions
The size of the human population, in the near-term and dis-tant future, is a key determinant of climate policy: All else
equal, a larger population entails more emissions and therefore
more mitigation to achieve a given climate target (1–3), and it
also means more future people will be vulnerable to climate-
related impacts. The extensive time lag between the environmen-
tal pressure (emissions) and the impacts (fully realized climate
damages) differentiates the climate problem from other issues
at the human population and environment nexus, as the costs of
mitigation will be borne largely by people now, but most of the
benefits will be experienced by a future stream of people which
is uncertain in size.
Our paper joins a large literature that estimates the social cost
of carbon dioxide (SCC), which is the economic cost, expressed
in present-day dollars, caused by the consequences for climate
change of an additional ton of carbon dioxide emissions (or its
equivalent)∗. Because in economic theory the optimal carbon
price is equal to the SCC (under certain optimality conditions),
we use these terms interchangeably.
Any framework for estimating the SCC and optimal miti-
gation effort has two prerequisites with respect to population:
(i) Emissions pressure: Analyses must explicitly account for a
range of plausible future population growth rates—which have
proved difficult to estimate even over relatively short time peri-
ods (4)—and their corresponding links with greenhouse gas
emissions. (ii) A social objective: There must be a consistent and
transparent approach for valuing the wellbeing of future popula-
tions through time.
The link between population and emissions (point i above)
has been the topic of a large literature (1, 2, 5–11) (SI Appendix,
section 2).
The same is not true for the link between population and the
valuation of wellbeing in the context of climate change (point ii
above) (12). This aspect is of critical importance because how
population is valued by society will determine the SCC and also
establish whether a policy that reduces population for climate
purposes is desirable overall.
Our paper addresses these questions by using Dynamic Inte-
grated Climate-Economy model 2013 (DICE2013), a leading
cost–benefit climate–economy model, to explore how population
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growth affects the SCC, optimal peak temperature, and
mitigation costs under alternative approaches to valuing
wellbeing.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In the Introduc-
tion we introduce two population-sensitive approaches for valu-
ing human wellbeing (these approaches are known as “social
objectives”) and explain the treatment of population in cost–
benefit climate–economy models (CEMs). In Main Results: Pop-
ulation Growth and the SCC, we use a range of recent pop-
ulation projections, together with the DICE model, to show
that population growth has a large effect on climate policy and
the SCC. This is true, although quantitatively different, using
either of the two most common approaches for comparing social
wellbeing across populations of different size, known as total
utilitarianism and average utilitarianism (described below). We
then extend our analysis by quantifying what these differences
imply in terms of mitigation expenditures, observing that smaller-
population futures imply lower mitigation costs under either eth-
ical approach, but on different timescales and with different con-
clusions about the overall desirability of different population
pathways.
Population and Wellbeing in CEMs
CEMs are the main tool for estimating the SCC and correspond-
ing optimal mitigation trajectories. It is important to differenti-
ate CEMs from other types of “integrated assessment models.”
Here CEMs refer specifically to cost–benefit models that eval-
uate the impact on wellbeing of climate change and associated
policy decisions and are the basis of estimates of the SCC. They
are distinct from other types of integrated assessment models
in that they quantify the economic damage from increased tem-
peratures, alongside descriptions of the economy and emission
processes (13). Three widely used cost–benefit-type models are
DICE, Climate Framework for Uncertainty, Negotiation, and
Distribution (FUND), and Policy Analysis of the Greenhouse
Effect (PAGE) (14).
The key tradeoff in these models is between mitigation and
climate damages, where mitigation expenditures disproportion-
ately subtract from the wellbeing of people now, while damages
disproportionately subtract from the wellbeing of people in the
more distant future. The tradeoff is made in a way that maxi-
mizes the objective of the model, called a “social welfare func-
tion” (SWF). All leading optimization CEMs share a total utili-
tarian (TU) SWF, according to which the (social) objective is to
maximize the sum of (discounted) wellbeing across time (15–18).
Globally aggregated CEMs such as DICE calculate the wellbe-
ing of the average individual for each point in time as the aver-
age consumption transformed into wellbeing by a utility function
which embodies “inequality aversion.” The TU objective is the
sum of the total wellbeing at each time point (average wellbe-
ing multiplied by the population size), with each time point dis-
counted to a present value at a chosen rate of “time preference.”
Although not currently applied in CEMs, other non-TU social
objectives are common in the population literature and could
be used instead (19). As a central example, an average utilitar-
ian (AU) social objective focuses on per capita wellbeing and
ignores population size, unless population size influences aver-
age wellbeing. The average utilitarian concept has had multiple
implementations in the literature. The AU SWF that this paper
uses provides a clear contrast with TU and integrates straight-
forwardly with the discrete-time structure of DICE and other
CEMs: It calculates levels of wellbeing from average consump-
tion in each time period and then maximizes the sum of those
multiplied by the discount factor, but not by the population.
However, other implementations exist: Asheim (20), studying the
value of population in the genuine savings criterion, uses a sim-
ilar AU as we do, while Arrow et al. (21) instead use an imple-
mentation which Dasgupta (19) calls “dynamic average utilitar-
ianism” and which divides the discounted sum of total utility
across time by the discounted sum of total population across
time. TU and AU each have theoretical advantages and disad-
vantages which have been explored in the population ethics liter-
ature (12, 19, 22), alongside other social objectives (23). AU and
TU are formally introduced as SWFs in SI Appendix, section 1.
In leading CEMs, population size is an exogenous variable
calibrated to a population projection at the time of the model
parameterization (15, 18). Although it is clear that updated pop-
ulation projections are one source of variation in results esti-
mated by different model versions (15), systematic testing of
alternative projections has not been standard in major assess-
ments (although see refs. 1 and 24 and more recently ref. 25);
even less research has focused on analyzing the importance
of assumptions about how population is valued by society and
what that means for climate policy. In stark contrast, there has
been comprehensive treatment of the ethical parameters that
determine the discount rate referred to above—the inequality
aversion parameter and the rate of time preference—with the
choice of these parameters becoming one of the most prominent
debates in climate economics (16, 26–29). The lack of attention
to the social valuation of population growth is particularly sur-
prising because population size, unlike the discounting parame-
ters, is modifiable by policy intervention.
Main Results: Population Growth and the Social Cost of
Carbon Dioxide
In this section, we explore the consequences for the mitigation
policy of assuming different potential future populations and
social objectives (TU vs. AU). We take our population pro-
jections from the 2015 revision of the United Nations (UN)-
medium, -low, and -high population scenarios (30) as well as a
more extreme (“Ultralow”) case based on Basten et al. (31) (Fig.
1A). Although we retain the names of the UN projections, we
have modified them by extending them beyond 2100, when they
end (Materials and Methods).
Analyses were conducted using a variant of the 2013 version
of the DICE model (15), with results summarized as differences
in optimal global harmonized carbon prices (Fig. 1B) and future
temperature rise (Fig. 1C) over time. We depart from the official
DICE2013 model only by fixing the savings rate at 25.8%, which
is consistent with other CEMs; this change has little impact on
results, as shown in SI Appendix, Fig. S1 (ref. 32, Materials and
Methods, and SI Appendix, section 2).
Each of these results is an optimal mitigation policy path under
DICE, meaning that mitigation effort maximizes intertemporal
discounted wellbeing, according to the chosen social objective.
Below, we also discuss results for the same population scenar-
ios but constrained by temperature targets. Unless otherwise
noted, all model runs assume a 1.5% annual rate of time pref-
erence and a 1.45 inequality aversion parameter (representing
the diminishing marginal utility of consumption), the values cho-
sen for DICE2013 by William Nordhaus, the architect of the
model. In SI Appendix a wider range of population projections
are tested, based on the shared socioeconomic pathways (SSPs)
and the UN’s probabilistic scenarios (SI Appendix, Fig. S2), as
well as sensitivity to the assumption of a near-zero (0.1%) rate of
time preference (SI Appendix, Fig. S3). SI Appendix also contains
results based on a regionalized version of DICE, demonstrating
that our general findings are unaffected when region-specific dif-
ferences in economic and climate variables, as well as population
estimates, are explicitly represented (SI Appendix, Fig. S4).
Carbon Price. The solid lines in Fig. 1B present results with the
standard TU social objective; dashed lines represent AU. The
results demonstrate that future population has a large effect on
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Fig. 1. Population scenarios and corresponding influences on optimal mitigation and temperature under the TU and AU social objectives. (A) UN-high,
-medium, and -low population scenarios (with extrapolations beyond 2100) and the Ultralow scenario. (B) Optimal prices. (C) Global average tempera-
ture rise.
optimal policy, with carbon prices over 85% higher in 2025 and
120% higher in 2050, assuming the UN-high compared with the
UN-low population scenario given the TU objective. Relatedly,
full abatement (100% decarbonization)—the point in Fig. 1B
where each carbon price path peaks and subsequently declines
along a single line (representing an assumed “backstop price”
at which zero carbon technologies are competitive with all fos-
sil fuels)—occurs more than half a century later under the UN-
low vs. UN-high scenario. Carbon prices in the Ultralow scenario
stay far lower still, and full abatement is never optimal given
the TU objective. A regionally disaggregated comparison of the
UN-medium with the UN-low scenario—as well as an alternative
comparison of an SSP-inspired population scenario—shows that
the differences in the SCC across alternative population projec-
tions are principally driven by differences in the future popula-
tion paths of developing countries, with sub-Saharan Africa the
greatest contributor (SI Appendix, Fig. S5 and Table S1).
The dashed lines in Fig. 1B present results under AU and
compared with the TU results (solid lines) elucidate the distinct
mechanisms by which population influences optimal climate pol-
icy. Note in particular that the AU curves diverge slowly, since
AU does not weight time periods by population size. In contrast,
the TU price paths quickly diverge from each other, even in the
near term, because TU is sensitive to the role of future popula-
tion growth in its weighting of period wellbeing.
In other words, in the near term, the AU price paths are insen-
sitive to the size of the future population because population
assumptions do not influence the social objective; it is the aver-
age level of wellbeing that matters. In the long run, however, the
AU price paths do diverge as the increasing difference in pop-
ulation size begins to cause an increasing disparity in emission
pressure. As a result, AU-optimal price paths become more like
their TU counterparts as more time passes. Further results in SI
Appendix, section 6 separate the effects on the optimized results
of the population weighting effect of future population growth
from the emission effects of future population growth: These two
mechanisms can be isolated by the use of diagnostic model runs
that mix one population path’s role in economic consumption
(emissions) with another population’s role in the social objective.
To help explain the mechanism of this result, consider a hypo-
thetical case of constant exponential population growth. Under
TU, the rate of population growth would be linearly added to
or subtracted from the rate of pure exponential time discounting
to determine the weight put on average wellbeing of future time
periods: The weighting roles of time preference and population
growth are analogous (ref. 3, p. 136 and SI Appendix, section 1).
Because the difference in population growth to 2200 between
the UN-high and -low scenarios is comparable to a 1.4 percent-
age point constant difference in population growth, we show in
SI Appendix, Fig. S6 that the difference in optimal policy under
TU between these population trajectories is similar to changing
the rate of pure time preference from 0.1% to 1.5%. A rate of
time preference ranging from 0.1% to 1.5% bounds the values
for time preference common in the climate economics and pol-
icy literature (16, 26, 28). Therefore, under TU, the importance
of population assumptions for optimal carbon policy is quantita-
tively comparable to the assumptions frequently debated about
time preference. Under AU, the rate of population growth has
no weighting effect.
Optimal Peak Temperature. Strikingly, temperatures increase less
in the higher-population optima (Fig. 1C). This is especially true
under TU, because a given level of climate damages registers as
a greater social cost when more people suffer from it.
Increasing the future population growth rate could theoreti-
cally increase or decrease optimal peak temperature under AU
and under TU. But the theoretically unambiguous prediction—
which our results display—is that population growth will reduce
optimal peak temperature more under TU than AU, because
there is an additional weighting effect of population. Fur-
ther, under both TU and AU, increasing the future population
increases the SCC, which accelerates the date of full mitigation
(100% decarbonization), causing peak temperature rise to be
lower and occur sooner. This effect is stronger under TU, again
because of the population weighting effect. (For more detail on
the result that TU optimal peak temperature falls with increasing
population and comparison with the literature, see SI Appendix,
section 3.)
One policy implication of these results is that whether differ-
ences in the assumed future population trajectory influence near-
term mitigation policy depends upon the choice of the social
objective: Under TU, near-term optimal climate policy is sen-
sitive to future population growth, but under AU it is much less
so. This finding has a direct bearing on potential mitigation cost
savings from putting the world on a lower-population trajectory,
which we consider in the next section.
Mitigation Cost Savings from Smaller Population Under TU
and AU
An important prior literature has explored whether human devel-
opment policies that reduce population size could lead to large
benefits through avoided climate mitigation costs (1, 2, 5, 7, 9–11).
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Accordingly, in this section we explore potential cost savings,
in quantitative terms, of achieving the UN-low vs. UN-medium
scenario. These two population scenarios were chosen because
our goal is to compare mitigation costs under the central popula-
tion projection against the costs under a lower-population alter-
native that may be roughly achievable given additional invest-
ments in human development.
To compute mitigation cost savings, we depart from the pre-
vious section, which presented optimal mitigation trajectories
without any constraint on the level of temperature increase, by
here estimating the mitigation costs (and savings) needed to
achieve targets of 2 ◦C and 3 ◦C under both population scenar-
ios. This allows us to compare costs when the level of temper-
ature rise is held constant, including at the 2 ◦C target that is
often considered necessary to prevent dangerous climate change.
(Note that a target of 2 ◦C and 3 ◦C requires greater than optimal
mitigation effort in DICE—see Fig. 1C for optimal peak temper-
atures.) Further results in SI Appendix, Table S4 investigate the
effect of population growth on mitigation costs when mitigation
effort is suboptimally low (i.e., results in higher peak tempera-
tures).
With the standard TU social objective, smaller population
entails lower near-term carbon prices and therefore results in
near-term mitigation cost savings (Fig. 2 and SI Appendix, Tables
S2 and S3). Regional disaggregation for the 2 ◦C target shows
that it is the wealthier regions—those most able to finance sus-
tainable development—that would save the most, in per capita
terms (SI Appendix, Fig. S7). With AU, cost savings occur only in
the more distant future. Results with additional population sce-
narios, robustness checks, and an explanation of the cost savings
calculation are available in SI Appendix, section 2 and Tables S2
and S3).
One debate within the climate literature is whether interven-
tions that reduce population growth rates would be effective cli-
mate policy, because a smaller future population will have lower
emissions, all else equal. Our results have an implication for that
debate: Under TU, a smaller future population implies near-
term mitigation cost savings in the tens of billions of dollars
annually. As a result, we show in Fig. 2 and associated results
and discussion in SI Appendix, section 4 and Tables S2 and S3
Fig. 2. Mitigation cost savings from moving from the UN-medium to the UN-low population path, under TU and AU social objectives, given 2 ◦C and 3 ◦C
temperature targets. Cost savings stop when full abatement is reached in both population scenarios.
that some feasible, noncoercive policies (e.g., education and
family planning programs) to promote human development in
the developing world—and thereby reduce fertility—can result
in avoided near-term climate mitigation costs more than large
enough to pay for the programs.
In contrast, because population growth has a smaller effect on
the near-term SCC under AU, policy to reduce future popula-
tion growth entails almost no near-term mitigation cost savings.
In fact, in the 2 ◦C case, the “savings” are slightly negative in
the first few periods: Although the theoretical prediction is clear
that reducing population growth would reduce overall mitigation
costs over the full future time horizon studied, there is no nec-
essary theoretical prediction about this numerical result in these
few periods where mitigation costs are very low under either pop-
ulation path. Reduced population growth would eventually offer
mitigation cost savings under both TU and AU as reduced pop-
ulation eventually causes reduced emissions pressure (Fig. 2).
This result suggests a possible rethinking of the reason why
reducing future population growth would reduce climate mitiga-
tion costs. The standard argument is that a reduced population
would influence mitigation policy because a smaller population
would have less emissions pressure. However, our AU and TU
results have identical populations and associated emissions pres-
sure. The large near-term difference in mitigation cost savings
with TU compared with AU therefore suggests another reason:
For any given level of climate change, increasing the future pop-
ulation increases the social valuation of climate damages under
TU but not under AU.
Does Reducing Population Improve Overall Wellbeing?
We have seen that mitigation cost savings arise, albeit on dif-
ferent timescales, under both TU and AU. Does this imply that
both TU and AU recommend policies to reduce population size?
Not necessarily, because mitigation cost savings are only one way
population size influences wellbeing. Because AU and TU value
population differently, the full valuation of a population path is
a further question.
Table 1 shows that the answer again depends on whether
AU or TU is chosen: In the context of our CEM, the sign of
recommended population policy depends on the treatment of
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Table 1. Social valuation of population paths by AU and TU, at
optimal climate policies, as a percentage of valuation of the UN-
medium path
Social objective UN-high, % UN-medium, % UN-low, %
AU 99.5 100 100.6
TU 192.3 100 40.4
population in the social objective. AU regards moving from UN-
medium to UN-low population as a slight improvement, because
average wellbeing is increased and there is no loss in wellbe-
ing from foregone people. In contrast, TU regards moving to a
smaller population as much worse.
This reveals a tension in the climate literature not previously
recognized: For a standard CEM to reconstruct and endorse a
common policy recommendation in the literature—that popula-
tion growth should be reduced as a form of climate mitigation—
requires an AU-like social objective. However, all CEMs with a
social objective assume TU. A TU social objective could recom-
mend policies that encourage lower population growth, but only
if, beyond the emissions reductions and climate mitigation ben-
efits entailed in DICE, other benefits of reduced population for
average wellbeing are large enough to outweigh the reduction in
population size.
Discussion
Climate change mitigation incurs a cost in the near term but
will primarily benefit people in the future, including an unknown
number of those not yet born. As a result, the number of future
people is an important determinant of climate policy, depend-
ing on how society chooses to value the quantity and quality of
people’s lives. As O’Neill and Wexler have discussed in regard
to the climate externalities of having children, “in general, com-
paring welfare across different population sizes introduces pro-
found theoretical issues” (ref. 10, p. 344), with advantages and
disadvantages of each approach.
Our results have used the DICE modeling framework to
show that alternative approaches to valuing wellbeing—common
outside of the climate literature—and alternative projections
of future population have large and often immediate impacts
on recommended climate mitigation policy. Moreover, these
assumptions interact, with the impact of different population
projections dependent on the role of population in the social val-
uation of wellbeing.
Our modeling approach has extended previous analyses in sev-
eral respects. DICE allows for a systematic integration of eco-
nomic and climatic variables alongside alternative approaches to
social wellbeing and enables an investigation of population size
to be placed within the SCC framework. Further investigation
could consider substituting AU for the TU objective function in
other CEMs.
Because the goal of our analysis is to highlight the importance
to the SCC of the role of population in the social objective, there
are limitations to our approach. These are discussed more fully
in SI Appendix, but we highlight three here.
First, DICE considers only the size of the population, but not
variables related to its composition. Instead, DICE subsumes
these into a reduced-form model of the economy that trans-
lates population size, capital stock, and technology into pro-
duction and emissions. We abstract away from population com-
position because our paper focuses principally on the valua-
tion of population rather than the emissions pressure of pop-
ulation. However, urbanization and age structure in particu-
lar have been shown to influence greenhouse gas emissions,
although studies suggest that the two may largely offset globally
(2, 6, 7).
Second, although we study exogenous population paths, pre-
vious work indicates that the links between fertility and cli-
mate impacts are not uniform across regions (2). Our robustness
checks in SI Appendix, using a regionalized version of DICE, sug-
gest that our results are robust to disaggregation.
Third, some policies affecting population growth may also
affect resilience to adverse impacts of climate change (33, 34).
Although such effects may be important for climate policy, they
are beyond the scope of our study, which focuses on the impor-
tance of population projections and values within the context of
a standard CEM. More broadly, our model has not considered
endogenous effects of climate change or climate policy on fer-
tility or any important nonclimate benefits of policy that offers
opportunities to reduce fertility.
The choice of an AU vs. TU social objective has meaning-
ful consequences for climate mitigation policy. This choice influ-
ences the SCC and can also determine both the magnitude and
sign of the appropriate population policy response to climate
change: Where TU would value the additional lives of a larger
population over the resulting climate damages and mitigation
expenditures, AU would recommend a smaller population to
avoid these costs. This choice is therefore important for climate
policy, although it is not yet widely discussed within the climate
change community.
Materials and Methods
We use the Excel version of the DICE2013 CEM as downloaded from
William Nordhaus’s website, which is freely available online (currently
at aida.econ.yale.edu/∼nordhaus/homepage/documents/) and has been
described in detail elsewhere (15, 35). Further details of the DICE model and
its assumptions are presented in SI Appendix, section 2. In Dataset S1 we
also present all data and the interactive, optimizable model in spreadsheet
form for every result.
Briefly, DICE is a global (single-region) optimization model that includes
an economic and a geophysical component that are linked. Economic
activity produces emissions, which are a function of gross domestic prod-
uct (output) and a time-varying ratio of emissions to output, as well as
emission control policies; carbon intensity is exogenous. Population influ-
ences emissions by influencing output via a Cobb–Douglas production
function. If unmitigated, emissions affect the future economy through
climate-related damages (24, 36), which increase with the global sur-
face temperature and are incurred as the loss of a percentage of out-
put. Emission reductions (mitigation) occur through a globally uniform
carbon price.
Like all leading CEMs, the size of the population is an exogenous vari-
able in DICE. In this study, we compute optimal carbon prices and thus
mitigation paths by exogenously specifying a variety of population tra-
jectories, based primarily on the 2015 revision of the UN’s World Popula-
tion Prospects and the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway project (30, 37, 38).
Both of these sources provide a range of population estimates through
2100. To project beyond 2100 we assume that the population growth rate
in the timestep ending in 2100 tapers linearly to zero between 2100 and
2195 and remains constant thereafter. The Ultralow projection continues
past 2100.
Other than the changes to population that are essential to our experi-
ments, the DICE2013 model is unchanged (including default parameter val-
ues, such as a climate sensitivity of 3.2) with one exception: We specify an
exogenous savings rate of 25.8%, which can be interpreted as the optimal
savings rate of private savers with a time-separable and discounted objec-
tive with a logarithmic utility function (32, 39). To explain this approach,
we first note that there are two alternative treatments of savings in the
climate–economy modeling literature: One approach assumes that eco-
nomic agents endogenously look forward to climate damages and poli-
cies and optimally adjust their planned savings (a leading example is in
the official versions of DICE/Regional Integrated Climate Economy (RICE)),
and another assumes that savings do not so respond to climate policy opti-
mization (leading examples are FUND and PAGE; in a DICE/RICE frame-
work, see ref. 32). Although both approaches are defensible, we pre-
fer and use the second approach, because we find it more realistic to
assume that society has a fixed appetite for savings that is essentially
insensitive to climate change and climate policy decisions. In SI Appendix,
Fig. S1, we demonstrate that our results are substantively identical and
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quantitatively very similar if we instead endogenize optimal savings as
in DICE.
In a small subset of our modeling runs, we also make an additional
change to DICE to investigate our research questions. To generate one result
reported in the main text, we change the rate of time preference to the
value that would make the optimal mitigation trajectory of the UN-low
population scenario provide the closest fit to that of the UN-high scenario
(SI Appendix, section 2 and Fig. S6). To generate results for the runs maxi-
mizing AU, we altered the social objective accordingly (SI Appendix, Eq. S2).
For Fig. 2, we maximize the social objective (AU or TU) subject to the con-
straint that temperature must never rise above the target in the 2 ◦C and
3 ◦C cases.
Please see SI Appendix, sections 1 and 2 for additional specifics of Materi-
als and Methods, which includes details on TU and AU, information on how
cost savings were calculated, and a description of the regionalized model-
ing that underlies the results presented in SI Appendix, Fig. S7 and Table S1
(40–47).
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SI Appendix 
 
Although the description of our method allows for all the DICE results to be reproduced exactly – 
the model and population estimates are freely available – we also include as Supporting 
Information the full DICE modeling and results in editable Excel spreadsheets. 
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Section	1. Formal	implementation	of	average	and	total	
utilitarianism	
 
In general, many social objectives, also called welfare functions (SWFs), are available in the 
population ethics literature, with varying approaches to social valuation of population size.  We 
study two forms, designed to be representative:  
• Average utilitarianism (AU): the type of SWF which does not regard extra people as a 
social benefit, all else equal, but instead averages well-being over the set of people which 
exist. 
• Total utilitarianism (TU): the type of SWF which considers total well-being, and is 
therefore increasing in the size of the population and in the level of average well-
being.  TU would regard extra people as a social benefit, all else equal, such that a larger 
population represents a social improvement, provided that the extra people are living 
lives worth living (adding to the total stock of well-being) and unless it is sufficiently 
offset by a decline in average well-being. 
As O'Neill and Wexler have discussed in a paper considering the climate externalities of having 
children, “in general, comparing welfare across different population sizes introduces profound 
theoretical issues” (10 p. 314).   Both AU and TU have advantages and disadvantages, which are 
well-explored in the economics and philosophy literature on social choice and welfare. 
Despite this plurality in the population ethics literature, cost-benefit climate-economy models 
essentially share the same TU equation for calculating present-discounted social welfare, W, at a 
given point in time t: 
 𝑊"# = 	 &'()*+)' × .'/012))234   (Equation S1: TU) 
Here 𝐿4 is the population in period t, 𝜌 the pure rate of time preference, and ct the average 
consumption in time t, scaled to wellbeing by the inequality aversion parameter h.  Note that in 
Equation S1, increasing the future population has an effect conceptually (and formally) similar to 
decreasing the rate of pure time preference, r, and thus gives more weight to the future in the 
calculation of the optimal trade-off between mitigation and damages. This is the equation that we 
use for TU. 
In contrast with the straightforward equation for TU, in an intertemporal context, “average 
utilitarianism” is ambiguous (19, p. 213-214).  This ambiguity is amplified when time 
discounting is introduced. Consequently, we use a form of average utilitarianism that involves 
applying time discounting to the average period wellbeing calculated by the model, with the 
objective of maximizing the sum of these discounted average period utilities – this is the SWF we 
describe as AU, which is related to the version used by Asheim (20):   
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 𝑊7# = 	 )()*+)' × .'/012))234   (Equation S2: AU) 
An alternative, more orthodox, implementation of average utilitarianism would simply divide the 
total sum of wellbeing by the total size of the present and future population; such an approach 
would ignore discounting, and show no pure time preference.  Another alternative, called 
“dynamic average utilitarianism” by Dasgupta (19) and used by Arrow, et al. (21), would divide 
the discounted TU objective function by the total discounted population of all present and future 
generations; because such a dynamic AU SWF would deliver the same results as TU in our 
exogenous-population analyses, and the same result as our version of AU when population size is 
endogenous, we do not further consider this approach. 
However, in a further sense, even these alternatives would not be the most theoretically pure 
version of AU, even ignoring the complicating role of time discounting.  This is because AU in 
its most pure form would average the wellbeing of the entire human population across history in 
the future and past.  On this view, whether or not creating future people is a social improvement 
depends, in part, on whether or not their lives are better than the lives of people who lived and 
died millennia ago.*  TU – like the implementation of AU that we use in our paper – does not 
have this dependency on the distant past because its additive structure separates the evaluation of 
future wellbeing from the evaluation of past wellbeing. 
 
Some generalized versions of TU involve a "critical level," which is a minimal level of wellbeing 
for adding an extra life to be regarded as a social improvement by the social welfare function: an 
extra life at a level of wellbeing below the critical level (even if it has positive utility) would 
lower the SWF.  Our implementation of TU assumes a critical level equal to a GDP per capita of 
$3,775 per year (the default value in DICE).  We note that any of our TU results for the SCC or 
optimal peak temperature would be numerically identical if a critical level were changed to any 
other (typically positive) number, because the additive critical level would not appear in the first 
order condition of the optimization.  This is because DICE's SCC optimization procedure does 
not endogenize the size of the population.  Critical levels are discussed further in Extension 4 
below. 
 
 	
                                                      
* “On this view, whether or not a person should have a child now depends in part on how well off 
– and how numerous – people were in the Stone Age, and it is difficult to see why this sort of 
consideration should be relevant.” p. 115. McMahan, Jefferson. "Problems of population theory." 
Ethics. (1981): 96-127. 
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Section	2. Methods:	further	details	
DICE and RICE modeling details 
We use the Excel version of the DICE2013 climate-economy model as downloaded from William 
Nordhaus’s website, which is freely available online 
(http://aida.wss.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage), and has been described in detail elsewhere (15, 
24).   
Briefly, DICE is a global (single-region) optimization model that includes an economic and a 
geophysical component that are linked. Economic activity produces emissions, which are a 
function of GDP (output) and a time-varying ratio of emissions-to-output, as well as emission 
control policies; carbon intensity is exogenous.  Population influences emissions by influencing 
output via a Cobb-Douglas production function.   
If unmitigated, emissions affect the future economy through climate-related damages, which 
increase with temperature and are incurred as the loss of a percentage of output. More 
specifically, DICE’s climate damages are based on 13 published studies that have estimated the 
magnitude of monetized impacts that would occur given a specified, discrete increase in 
temperature (36).  The continuous (with temperature) DICE damage function was parameterized 
by assuming that damages are a quadratic function of temperature and that there are no tipping 
points.  The number and types of impacts assessed in the underlying studies varied, but normally 
included changes in agricultural productivity, human health (mortality and/or morbidity from 
climate-sensitive diseases), and damages from extreme weather events and sea-level rise, 
amongst other factors. 
The key tradeoff in the model, therefore, is between mitigation, which incurs a cost relatively 
soon, and climate damages, which incur costs in the more distant future. The standard 
optimization maximizes the sum of discounted wellbeing across time (i.e., has a TU SWF as in 
Equation S1).  When a temperature target is added, the optimization is constrained to first ensure 
that temperature rise in the future stays at or below that target, and then the objective is 
maximized subject to that constraint. 
Like all leading climate economy models, the size of the population is an exogenous variable in 
DICE (meaning that it is predetermined and that the model therefore has perfect foresight in this 
regard). 
Other than the changes to population that are essential to our experiments, the DICE2013 model 
is unchanged (including default parameter values, such as a climate sensitivity of 3.2) with one 
exception: we specify an exogenous savings rate of 25.8%, which can be interpreted as the 
optimal savings rate of private savers with a time-separable and discounted objective with a 
logarithmic utility function (33,39). To explain this approach, we first note that there are two 
alternative treatments of savings in the climate-economy modeling literature: one approach that 
assumes that economic agents endogenously look forward to climate damages and policies and 
optimally adjust their planned savings (a leading example is in the official versions of 
DICE/RICE), and another approach that assumes that savings do not so respond to climate policy 
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optimization (leading examples are FUND and PAGE; in a DICE/RICE framework, see (33). We 
prefer the second approach, which leads to our departure here from the official DICE model, on 
the grounds that we find it more realistic to assume that society has a fixed appetite for savings 
that is essentially insensitive to climate change and climate policy decisions. In Figure S1, we 
demonstrate that our results are substantively identical and quantitatively very similar if we 
instead endogenize optimal savings as in the official DICE model. 
In certain modeling runs, we also make additional changes to DICE in order to investigate our 
research questions. Most importantly, to generate results for the runs maximizing AU, we altered 
the SWF accordingly as described in Equation S2 of the previous section.  To explore the 
relationship of population growth and the rate of pure time preference (Figure S6 below), we 
changed the latter to the value that would make the optimal mitigation trajectories of the UN-
medium and UN-low population scenarios provide the closest fit to that of the UN-high scenario. 
Here, closest fit is understood as the assumption for time preference that minimizes the 
differences between carbon prices squared in the resulting optimum and the default UN-high 
optimum, summed over all time periods.  
For all analyses, DICE2013 initializes in 2010 with identical carbon prices (= $1).  Although the 
model has a 300 year time horizon, we do not present results over the whole period since full 
mitigation occurs much earlier in almost all analyses. 
In a few analyses found only here in the Supporting Information (not in the main text), we present 
results derived from a regionalized version of DICE known as RICE.  As opposed to DICE, 
which is a single-region (global) model, RICE is regionalized and therefore has region-specific 
parameters including, for example, total factor productivity and emission intensities as well as 
population growth, which we aggregated from UN country-level data.  Climate damages are also 
region-specific and taken from reference (24).  The carbon price however, is globally 
harmonized.† The standard implementation of RICE has been described in detail elsewhere (24, 
15).  We make three additional modifications to RICE2010 (the most recent version of RICE). 
The first is to eliminate the use of Negishi weights, which were introduced originally to restrict 
redistribution and ensure that it does not become a policy tool. In our version of RICE, we do not 
use Negishi weights, as described in a previous publication (33). Second, we fix the savings rate 
at 25.8%, with the same rationale as above for our DICE modeling. In light of this, our 
implementation might more aptly be referred to as “RICE with fixed savings and without Negishi 
weights”. Third, we substitute a reduced form version of the RICE2010 sea level rise damage 
module in our implementation; see (33) for details. The countries comprising the twelve regions 
can be found in the Supporting Spreadsheet, as can all summary results from these analyses using 
our variant of RICE. 
                                                      
†Although a global harmonized carbon price is considered the most economically efficient carbon price 
solution, and is the default in RICE, studies have modified cost-benefit climate-economy models to allow 
for regionally determined carbon prices.  For two examples, see Anthoff, D (2009) Optimal Global 
Dynamic Carbon Taxation, (ESRI), WP278, and Budolfson M, Dennig, F (in press) Optimal Global 
Climate Policy and Regional Carbon Prices. In Chichilnisky, G, Sheeran, K, & Rezai, A eds., Handbook on 
the Economics of Climate Change, (Edward Elgar). 
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Population projections 
In this study, we compute optimal carbon taxes and thus mitigation paths by exogenously 
specifying a variety of population trajectories, based primarily on the 2015 revision of the United 
Nations’ World Population Prospects, and also on the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway project 
(30, 37, 38).  Both of these sources provide a range of population estimates through 2100. To 
project beyond 2100 in cases where we use a projection that stops at 2100, we assume that the 
population growth rate in the time-step ending in 2100 tapers linearly to zero between 2100 and 
2195 and remains constant thereafter.  
This assumption means that there are only relatively modest changes in population after 2100. 
Therefore, to explore the possibility of a more dramatic decline in population, we also include an 
additional “Ultra low” population scenario based on results in Basten et al. (31) that assumes a 
life expectancy converging on 100 and a fertility of 1.5, which is slightly lower than the European 
Union’s fertility today (1.58). The other scenarios reported in the main text are based on the UN-
medium scenario, which is the scenario considered most likely by the UN, and the UN-high and 
UN-low scenarios, where fertility is projected to be 0.5 above and below the UN-medium, 
respectively. All 16 of the scenarios analyzed are presented graphically in Fig. S2.   
Computation of mitigation cost savings 
To compute mitigation cost savings (as displayed in Figure 2 of the main text and Tables S2-S4), 
we program DICE with the relevant AU or TU objective and then maximize that objective subject 
to the constraint that temperature must never rise above the target.  
To calculate the per capita mitigation cost savings between a higher and lower population 
scenario in a given time period, we first calculate the difference in cost as a percentage of per 
capita GDP and then multiply that difference by the per capita GDP in the lower scenario, as 
follows: 
89.:;<:=>?@A9.:;<:=> − 89.CDE=>?@A9.CDE=> ∗ 	𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐LMNOP  (Equation S3) 
where 𝑀𝑝𝑐 refers to the mitigation cost per capita and 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐 refers to the GDP per capita. To 
calculate total mitigation cost savings, the per capita cost savings is then multiplied by the 
population in the lower scenario (see Table S2 for an example calculation).  We believe a 
comparison normalized to the percentage of per capita GDP in this way is more appropriate than 
one based on absolute cost differences, because the two societies would have different sized 
economies (including in per capita terms, for example because of a different capital-labor ratio) 
that would in turn be shared by a different number of people. For example, without normalization, 
the difference in the absolute total cost of abatement in 2050 between UN-medium and UN-low 
with a 2°C constraint is approximately 370% higher than reported in the top section of Table S3, 
which is misleading because costs are shared by a larger population in UN-high than in UN-low. 
Similarly, without normalization ,the difference in per capita costs in 2050 is approximately 45% 
lower, which is misleading because costs are borne by a population that is poorer per capita in 
UN-medium than in UN-low. (These calculations with normalized cost savings are used to 
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generate numbers displayed in Figure 2 of the main text and Tables S2-S4. A comparison of cost 
savings with and without normalization can be found in Table S3, which demonstrates that our 
preferred normalization is quantitatively very similar to a simple per capita normalization .) 
 The “consumption effect” elasticity: The effect of population on emissions pressure 
The consumption effect of a larger population on emissions, through expanded economic activity, 
is a largely empirical question with an important existing literature.  Our paper – with its focus on 
social valuation – builds upon this literature, which we review briefly here along with its 
implications for our modeling framework.   
O'Neill et al. (7) summarize the results on the relationship between population and emissions that 
were obtained by various estimations of the STIRPAT (Stochastic Impacts by Regression on 
Population, Affluence and Technology) equation.  The authors conclude from the existing 
evidence that CO2 emissions from energy respond roughly proportionally to population, but argue 
in favor of improved regression methodologies going forward, and in particular for panel 
regressions taking account of time series effects.  Adopting this methodology, Liddle (6) and 
Casey & Galor (5) find that population may have a much greater influence on emissions than 
income per capita.  
One issue therefore, is whether the economic effect of population on emissions is conceived in a 
reduced form way that incorporates all mechanisms, or whether the effect is estimated through 
particular economic pathways.  We use the reduced-form DICE model, in which the elasticity of 
emissions is equal to one with respect to income and to 0.7 with respect to population (this is the 
coefficient of labor in the production function).  However, the Liddle (6) and Casey & Galor (5) 
results may be more comparable with ours if what drives their estimates is the fact that emission 
intensity is influenced by income growth (via learning and technology replacement effects) and 
by population trends (via education being associated both with lower population and lower 
emission intensity). These mechanisms are imperfectly captured in our model via a trend on 
intensity. Our results can therefore be taken as capturing the most basic effects of population and 
may underestimate the potential climate benefits of reducing population. 
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Section	3. Further	discussion	of	optimal	peak	temperature	results	
Our finding that optimal peak temperatures are lower given higher population under the standard 
TU social objective is a striking result that contrasts with an important previous study, (1), that 
used a much older vintage of DICE, DICE1994. The explanation of the sign difference between 
our results and the previous study (1) is that due to a modeling error, DICE1994 erroneously 
assumed that the cost as a proportion of GDP of mitigating a given fraction of business-as-usual 
emissions was increasing over time, whereas the correct assumption as in DICE2013 is that it 
decreases. As acknowledged over a decade ago by the architect of DICE, William Nordhaus, the 
older mitigation cost assumption was a mistaken modeling assumption (“The basic functional 
form for the abatement-cost function follows the structure assumed in the earlier DICE models. 
However, the structure has been reformulated over time to correct for an earlier modeling 
mistake. …The prior version used a functional form that implicitly and mistakenly assumed that 
the cost of the backstop technology increased over time. … Although this new specification 
makes little difference in the short run (to the tactics of climate policy, so to speak), it turns out 
that it makes a major difference over the long run (to the strategy or vision)” (42, p. 52-3)).   
This error in the earlier model explains the sign difference between our results and (1), as 
importing the older, mistaken backstop assumptions (and as a direct consequence, mistaken 
mitigation cost assumptions) into DICE2013 yields results analogous to (1). In our results with 
the corrected mitigation cost assumptions, increasing the future population increases the SCC 
under both TU and AU, which accelerates the date of full mitigation (100% decarbonization), 
causing peak temperature rise to be lower and occur sooner. This effect is stronger under TU, 
because of the population weighting effect. When the pre-1999 vintages of DICE are run, or if 
their mistaken mitigation cost assumptions are imported into DICE2013, full mitigation never 
occurs, which accounts for the sign difference. If one mistakenly built into the modelling 
assumptions that full mitigation would never occur, then higher population would indeed lead to 
higher peak temperature, as the higher social cost of carbon would then not have the correct result 
of entailing faster full mitigation. 
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Section	4. Evidence	and	debates	on	population	policy	
A large literature studies the effectiveness of population and development policies on population 
size and growth, in ways that are relevant to climate change.  One way to think about the 
relevance of this literature is that population policy can only be applicable to climate policy if it 
indeed can influence population growth rates, at acceptable costs and without other undesirable 
consequences.   
Our paper, which does not do original econometric analysis of empirical data, employs estimates 
(especially of cost savings) from this literature.  Because space is limited in the paper, we 
elaborate here on the evidence and debate in some papers in this literature.  
There is considerable debate about the causes of the fertility reduction of the demographic 
transition, and in particular about the extent to which fertility reduction has been caused or 
accelerated by policy efforts, rather than by endogenous changes in behavior, such as responses to 
mortality decline or the importance of human capital (4).  Connelly (41), describing the history of 
population policy, describes how some coercive policies have caused harm, especially to 
populations in developing countries.  We abstract from much of this debate: our results are not 
intended to quantify full the social welfare implications of such programs, inclusive of any such 
important social costs.   
Rather, in the spirit of Abel, et al.’s (43) investigation of a subset of the Sustainable Development 
Goals, we refer the reader to evidence that development programs that promote human 
development, child health, social equality, and women’s social status also can lead parents to 
freely choose lower fertility.  They find that the achievement of the SDGs would lead to a world 
population in 2100 of around 8.2-8.7 billion. This is substantially below the UN-lower 95th 
projection, leading Abel, et al to suggest that the UN prediction range is therefore too narrow.  
Wheeler and Hammer (11) show that family planning and women's education is a very cost-
effective mitigation policy, via reduced population growth, compared to other options such as 
solar or wind.  O’Neill (9) and O’Neill and Wexler (10) make similar computations and 
arguments about fertility policy.   
What matters for policy is not merely that reducing population has climate consequences, but also 
the quantitative comparison of costs.  We cannot know these hypothetical future costs in detail, 
but build upon estimates in the literature to understand their general magnitude.  The spending 
shortfall for providing all women in the developing world with access to modern contraception 
was recently estimated at about $5 billion per year (44) and providing all children in low and 
lower-middle income countries a quality education at $40 billion annually (45).  Both of these 
policies would be non-coercive, leaving women no less free than before to choose their fertility, 
and perhaps freer. 
Along those lines, a fundamental aspect that we have not discussed in detail is that the non-
climate benefits of policies that lower fertility – including better maternal and child health, 
improved gender equality, and more human capital – could be large, and could exceed the 
benefits from any avoided mitigation costs.  Our observation, joining this existing literature and 
quantifying it in the context of a leading CEM, is that any successful low-fertility program would 
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have a reduction in climate mitigation costs and damages to count among its other benefits, many 
of which are highly desirable in their own right.    
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Section	5. Supplementary	exhibits	(Figures	and	Tables)	
 
 
This section presents all the supplementary figures and tables referred to in the main article.  
Additional exhibits from several extensions are reported in the next section. For all exhibits, data 
for the full multi-century time horizon can be found in the Supporting Spreadsheet, which is 
editable and optimizable by the user. 
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Fig. S1. Optimal carbon prices with an exogenous (exo) savings rate fixed at 25.8% 
and an endogenously (endo) determined savings rate under TU.  
  
Notes on Fig. S1 
In all analyses in the paper, we use a fixed savings rate, but standard DICE uses an endogenously 
determined savings rate (see Methods).  This figure demonstrates the similarity of the two 
approaches, illustrated with a total utilitarian objective.  
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Fig. S2. (a) Population projections analyzed in DICE, based on data from the United 
Nations (UN) and the Shared Socioeconomic Pathway project (SSP) and an “Ultra-
low” scenario, (b) optimal carbon prices with a TU social objective and (c) optimal 
carbon prices with an AU social objective. 
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Notes on Fig. S2: The UN and SSP data can be found in references (30,37) while the “Ultra-low” 
scenario is based on reference (31) and assumes that global fertility converges to 1.5 with a life 
expectancy of 100. Optimal carbon prices are reported with TU objective only for illustration. 
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Fig. S3. (a) Optimal carbon taxes and (b) temperature rise assuming near-zero time 
preference (0.1% per annum).   
 
Notes on Fig. S3 
Here the “Stern” tax path is based on the UN-medium population with the parameter values 
assumed in the Stern Review (16), which includes near-zero time preference as well as low 
inequality aversion (1.01) and uses a TU social objective. These results show that even with UN-
high population, mitigation effort with near-zero time preference never reaches Stern’s rates in 
the near-term when inequality aversion is relatively high (1.45 vs. Stern’s value of 1.01), but yet 
at the same time, the point of full mitigation is similar (2050 vs 2055 for Stern and UN-high, 
respectively). 
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Fig. S4. Comparison of optimal carbon price pathways for the UN-high, -medium, 
and –low population scenarios in DICE vs. the regionalized version of DICE known 
as RICE. Here we compare the results in our implementation of DICE2013 (as 
presented in the main text) to results in a modified version of RICE2010 
(modifications described above).  
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Notes on Fig. S4 
Here we present two sets of results from our implementation of RICE2010.  The first uses the 
standard RICE assumption that each region has its own backstop price (one of which is 
substantially higher than DICE’s global backstop). The second uses a single globally aggregated 
backstop price from RICE and is presented for comparative purposes only, as it is similar to (but 
slightly higher than) the DICE2013 backstop. All of our regionalized analyses use the standard 
RICE assumption of different regional backstops. This is robustness illustration uses the standard 
total utilitarian objective. 
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Fig. S5. Global population as projected in the UN-high, - medium and –low 
scenarios.  Color bands show the contribution of each region represented in RICE to 
the difference between the three scenarios.  
  
5
10
15
20
25
po
pu
lat
ion
 si
ze
 (b
illi
on
s)
2000 2050 2100 2150 2200
year
Japan
Russia
Other High Income
US
Eurasia
EU
Latin America
Middle East
China
Other Asia
India
Africa
medium projection
low & high projections
Scovronick, et al. SI: Supplementary Information page 19 
 
Fig. S6. Optimal carbon prices for three UN population scenarios estimated with the 
standard TU social objective and using the default rate of pure time preference (r) 
of 1.5% per annum, as well as two cases with different rates of pure time preference 
(0.75% and 0.1%) for comparison (while keeping inequality aversion = 1.45).  
 
 
 
Notes on Fig. S6 
To explore the relationship of population growth and the rate of pure time preference, we changed 
the latter to the value that would make the optimal mitigation trajectories of the UN-medium and 
UN-low population scenarios provide the closest fit to that of the UN-high scenario. Here, closest 
fit is understood as the assumption for time preference that minimizes the differences between 
carbon prices squared in the resulting optimum and the default UN-high optimum, summed over 
all time periods. 
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Fig. S7. Per capita abatement cost savings by region under the UN-low compared to 
the UN-medium population scenario given a 2 °C temperature target. (We show 
results only with a TU objective because there are negligible cost differences in the 
near term with an AU objective.) 
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Table S1. Optimal carbon prices ($/ton CO2) for four select population scenarios 
and the change in the UN-medium price when only specified regions follow the UN-
low scenario.  Results derived from a variant of the RICE model using the standard 
TU objective. 
 2025 2045 2065 
Price when all regions have UN-medium population $30.37 $58.01 $97.63 
Price when all regions have UN-low population $23.53 $41.66 $64.45 
Price when only developing regions have UN-low population* $23.97 $43.23 $68.50 
Price when all regions have SSP1 population** $21.47 $37.96 $59.16 
    
Percent change from UN-medium carbon price (above) if only indicated region has UN-low 
population while all others retain UN-medium population 
Africa (sub-Saharan) -10.9 -10.9 -16.2 
China  -2.5 -2.5 -4.1 
Eurasia  -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 
Europe -0.5 -0.5 -1.2 
India  -3.0 -3.0 -2.6 
Japan  -0.1 -0.1 -0.3 
Latin America  -0.6 -0.6 -1.2 
Middle East and North Africa -1.3 -1.3 -2.3 
Other Asia  -2.1 -2.1 -1.9 
Other High Income  -0.2 -0.2 -0.6 
Russia  -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 
USA  -0.4 -0.4 -1.9 
* Here “developing” refers to Africa, China, India, Latin America, Middle East/North Africa and 
Other Asia. All other regions have UN-medium population. 
** Applies to the global total population and the regional composition. 
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Table S2. The information in this table illustrates the calculation of the normalized 
avoided mitigation costs between scenarios (here given a constraint of a 2 °C 
increase in global temperature, and with a total utilitarian social objective). 
Population is in millions and GDP in 2005 US Dollars. Values rounded. (We 
illustrate with a total utilitarian objective because near-term cost differences are 
negligible with an average utilitarian objective, as shown in Figure 2 of the main 
text.) 
  2020 2030 2040 2050 
UN-medium Population  7,758 8,501 9,157 9,725 
 GDP per capita*  11,649 14,570 17,936 21,691 
 Abatement cost per capita  42 99 224 481 
UN-low Population  7,689 8,180 8,532 8,710 
 GDP per capita*  11,685 14,704 18,163 22,045 
 Abatement cost per capita  38 93 214 471 
UN-lower 80th Population  7,732 8,411 8,984 9,440 
 GDP per capita*  11,661 14,605 17,996 21,785 
 Abatement cost per capita  41 98 221 478 
UN-lower 95th Population  7,718 8,360 8,889 9,284 
 GDP per capita*  11,669 14,625 18,029 21,838 
 Abatement cost per capita  41 97 220 477 
SSP2 Population  7,612 8,256 8,772 9,140 
 GDP per capita*  11,718 14,648 18,048 21,868 
 Abatement cost per capita  40 95 216 471 
SSP2FT Population  7,567 8,131 8,546 8,792 
 GDP per capita*  11,740 14,696 18,127 21,987 
 Abatement cost per capita  39 93 213 465 
SSP1 Population  7,535 8,024 8,357 8,504 
 GDP per capita*  11,756 14,741 18,196 22,090 
 Abatement cost per capita  38 91 209 460 
Example calculation: To calculate the normalized per capita cost savings in the UN-medium 
compared to the UN-low scenario in 2050, as described in Section 2 above, the calculation is as 
follows: 48121691 − 47122045 ∗ 	22045 = ~$18 
The total global savings is that number (~18) multiplied by the population in the UN-low scenario 
(~8710 million). 
* All GDP estimates are from DICE, including those using SSP populations. 
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Table S3. Abatement cost savings of achieving the UN-low versus UN-medium 
population under the total utilitarian optimal pathway that meets different 
temperature targets for: the default parameterization with normalization (top 
section), without normalization (middle panel), and normalized with near-zero 
discounting (0.1% per annum) (bottom section). Values are rounded.  
  2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Default parameterization with normalization 
2°C 
Per capita ($) 4 5 7 10 13 16 18 
Total (billion $) 30 43 61 84 111 137 157 
3°C 
Per capita ($) 3 4 6 8 12 16 21 
Total (billion $) 22 33 49 70 99 135 180 
Default parameterization without normalization 
2°C 
Per capita ($) 4 5 7 8 10 11 10 
Total (billion $) 32 52 85 140 227 363 577 
3°C 
Per capita ($) 3 4 6 8 11 15 19 
Total (billion $) 23 36 55 83 123 178 252 
Near-zero time preference with normalization 
2°C 
Per capita ($) 8 10 12 14 16 16 16 
Total (billion $) 61 78 96 116 132 141 137 
3°C 
Per capita ($) 29 40 55 75 101 134 176 
Total (billion $) 220 318 451 629 861 1159 1530 
 
Notes on Table S3 
The top section of the table reports the same numbers presented in the TU lines of Figure 2 of the 
main text. The cost savings can be viewed as a type of budget that is available to decision makers 
to implement policies capable of moving the world's population from a trajectory like the UN-
medium variant to one like the UN-low; staying within budget would pay for itself entirely 
through avoided climate abatement costs, even without accounting for the other primary benefits 
generally associated with a faster peak in global population (34,46). With this budget in mind, it 
is worth comparing the avoided costs in the above table with spending shortfalls for two human 
development interventions associated with fertility decline: ensuring access to family planning 
(modern contraception) and quality education. Recent studies estimate the shortfalls for these 
programs, respectively, at about $5 billion and $40 billion per year (44,45).  The results therefore 
suggest that the avoided mitigation costs could cover the whole funding shortfall for family 
planning by 2020, and both programs soon thereafter.   
However, it is important here to acknowledge that the UN-low population path is defined 
by the mechanistic assumption that fertility in all regions would be 0.5 children lower, which is a 
crude assumption. It would be difficult to achieve this level of decline in many wealthy regions 
and almost certainly not through additional investments in education or family planning, as these 
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are already supplied to a large extent.However, studies indicate that roughly this level of global 
fertility decline – which is what is important in DICE – may be achievable given large and 
sustained policy intervention (2,47,48), although there is debate about the full effects of such 
policies. Additionally, Table S1 shows that most of the change in the carbon prices from the UN-
medium to UN-low result from changes in the developing regions. 
Two additional notes to this analysis should be mentioned.  First, a successful human 
development policy could also increase average per capita emissions pressure – even while 
reducing population size – by increasing the economic productivity of a more educated 
population with more female labor force participation.  A second is that some historical 
population policies have harmed wellbeing, sometimes without actual substantially changing 
population growth (41), which is a note of caution. 
An additional reason for presenting this table is to demonstrate that our normalization procedure 
(see Section 2 above) makes little difference overall, but is slightly more conservative than 
directly taking the difference in mitigation costs between the UN-medium and UN-low scenarios.   
(We do not report equivalent results with an average utilitarian objective because near-term cost 
differences are negligible as shown in Figure 2 of the main text.) 
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Section	6. Extensions	
In this section we extend the results analyses in the main text through a series of additional 
experiments described below.    
 
Extension 1. Mixed-population paths: Isolating the role of population in 
consumption and in social welfare weighting of time periods 
In this section we explain the mechanisms through which population growth affects mitigation 
policy by separating the two primary factors linking population growth to carbon prices. First, if 
there is a TU social objective and future population is greater, then greater weight is given to 
future damages, as there are more future people to suffer them.  In this sense population growth 
acts like lowering the discount rate, increasing the current incentive to reduce emissions by 
increasing the importance of the future. Second, a larger future population puts upward pressure 
on future emissions and corresponding damages, making emissions reductions more costly to 
achieve. We refer to the first factor as the “Weighting effect” (i.e. population’s weighting of the 
future in the SWF), and the second factor as the “Consumption effect” (i.e. more emissions and 
climate damages in the absence of mitigation).  
Understanding the full consequences of population for climate policy requires understanding the 
separate roles of these two separate mechanisms, which we decompose in Figure S8.  In 
particular, we compute two mixed-assumption scenarios: 
• High population consumption, low population weighting in the SWF: here economic 
activity (and thus unmitigated emissions) is computed as though the population were on 
the high trajectory but wellbeing is calculated and optimized as though population were 
on the low trajectory;  
• Low population consumption, high population weighting in the SWF: here we do the 
reverse, using the low population trajectory for computing economic activity (and thus 
unmitigated emissions) and the high trajectory in the weighting and optimization of the 
SWF. 
This experiment with artificial scenarios is meant to clarify the role of the two population effects 
on the recommended climate policy.  It is not very different from investigating non-artificial 
scenarios: what would be the optimal policy if we believe that a UN-high quantity of future 
people will be exposed to climate damages, but if we also believe that those people will be more 
frugal and only cause the emissions profile entailed by a UN-low quantity of future people? Or 
conversely, what is the optimal policy if we believe that a UN-low quantity of future people will 
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be exposed to climate damages, but they are profligate and cause the emission profile entailed by 
a UN-high quantity of people?   
Perhaps more importantly for the main result of our paper, this mixed-scenario experiment 
clarifies the mechanisms by which the future population path has its effect under AU and TU.  
This is because, even while using a TU SWF, the “low population in SWF, high population 
consumption” path behaves similarly to AU using the high population path.  Under AU, the 
impact of the high population path on the economy is considered, but it has no effect on social 
welfare weighting; in the mixed path, future population growth has some effect on future 
population weighting because population is not constant under the low path, but it is substantially 
reduced.  Therefore, the eventually increasing mitigation costs due to eventually emissions 
pressure of greater population under this mixed path is conceptually similar to the initially low 
but eventually increasing mitigation costs under AU with a high future population. 
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Fig. S8. Optimal carbon price and emissions pathways for standard population 
scenarios and specified mixed assumption scenarios. The mixed assumption 
experiment is designed separate the role of population growth in the weighting of 
social welfare from its role in contributing to unmitigated emissions and (potential) 
climate damages via consumption. This figure is only informative given a TU 
objective because with an AU objective there would be no social welfare weighting 
effect. 
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The upper left of panel (panel “a”) of Fig. S8 presents the results of this experiment.  In the 
figure, four lines are plotted: the recommended tax paths of these two hypothetical, mixed-
assumption scenarios are plotted as dashed lines alongside the original TU paths under the non-
mixed UN-high and -low population scenarios, repeated from Fig. 1b of the main text as solid 
lines. The comparative importance of the two mechanisms changes over time. In the short run, the 
weighting effect dominates: both mixed-assumption optima closely match the optima of 
whichever population assumption is used in the SWF.  For example, in early decades, the mixed 
scenario with high population in the SWF resembles the simple high-population scenario.  This 
short-run result is because, during the nearest decades, the population implications with regard to 
emissions remain in the future, but there is still a mechanism for future population growth to 
influence near-term taxes through how the future is valued. Panel (b) of Figure S8 reports the 
emissions associated with the carbon price path. 
In the long run of about a century, the economic consumption effect comes to dominate, a 
reversal visible in the crossing of the dashed lines.  The long-run reversal occurs when faster 
population growth eventually translates into (increasingly) larger populations with (increasingly) 
greater total consumption and unmitigated emissions.  It is at this point that the population paths 
used in the economy become more important. Therefore, the two mixed-assumption optimal tax 
paths cross in the late 21st century. For further analyses, compare the upper and lower left panels 
(panels “a” and “c”) of Fig. S8, which show how the result is qualitatively the same when 
comparing the UN-medium vs UN-low scenarios (or any higher vs lower scenario under this 
parameterization. 
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Extension 2. Exploring mitigation costs for temperature targets that are sub-
optimally high (4 °C and 5 °C) 
In Table S4 we report mitigation cost savings under temperature targets that entail less than 
optimal mitigation, namely 4 °C and 5°C.  In these cases, we maximize the objective function 
subject to the relevant temperature constraint assuming constant growth of carbon prices from the 
starting values in the 3°C cases (by which we mean, starting in the UN-low variant from the 
initial carbon price in the UN-low 3°C case, and starting in the UN-medium variant from the 
initial carbon price in the UN-medium 3°C case).  The cost savings are calculated as described in 
Section 1 above.  
 
Table S4. Abatement cost savings under sub-optimally high temperature targets of 
achieving the UN-low versus UN-medium population under the total utilitarian 
optimal pathway that meets different temperature targets for: the default 
parameterization with normalization (top section), without normalization (middle 
panel), and normalized with near-zero discounting (bottom section). Values are 
rounded.  
  2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050 
Default parameterization with normalization 
4°C 
Per capita ($) 3 5 8 10 14 18 22 
Total (billion $) 26 42 62 87 118 154 195 
5°C 
Per capita ($) 3 5 7 9 11 14 17 
Total (billion $) 25 38 54 73 96 122 152 
Default parameterization without normalization 
4°C 
Per capita ($) 3 5 7 10 13 17 21 
Total (billion $) 27 44 68 98 137 186 245 
5°C 
Per capita ($) 3 5 6 8 11 14 17 
Total (billion $) 25 39 58 80 108 142 182 
Near-zero time preference with normalization 
4°C 
Per capita ($) 23 26 30 34 38 42 47 
Total (billion $) 179 210 245 282 323 365 410 
5°C 
Per capita ($) 23 26 29 32 35 39 43 
Total (billion $) 176 205 235 268 303 339 376 
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Extension 3. Assume equal mitigation effort, then compute the resulting difference 
in emissions and the savings from avoided climate damages 
This subsection describes an alternative method for conceptualizing the climate benefits of a 
lower population in connection with suboptimal mitigation effort and a TU social objective.  
The key assumption behind the mitigation cost savings analysis described in the earlier sections 
and displayed in Figure 2 of the main text and Tables S2-S4 is that the world will be willing to 
spend more on mitigation in the higher population (UN-medium) scenario because there is a 
temperature target to meet.  An alternative assumption is that society may have a fixed appetite 
for mitigation, regardless of population.  In Table S5, we show the implications of this alternative 
assumption for different levels of mitigation effort (different “appetites”), ranging from higher 
than optimal effort, to much less than optimal effort, to no effort at all; using DICE we quantify 
the resulting difference in emissions between the UN-medium and UN-low scenarios for each 
level of effort, and quantify the resulting difference in climate damages. In other words, in this 
section the benefit of a lower population appears (by the design of the experiment) in the form of 
avoided climate damages with a lower versus higher population, rather than in the form of 
avoided mitigation cost. 
To model this alternative assumption that society might have a fixed appetite for mitigation, we 
define a level of mitigation effort at a specified time as the mitigation cost as a percentage of per 
capita GDP, and a level of mitigation effort pathway as a particular level of mitigation effort at 
each time point into the future. With these definitions in hand, we consider the four mitigation 
effort pathways that yield the four UN-medium temperature target scenarios reported in Tables 
S3 and S4 – i.e., we consider the mitigation effort pathway that yields peak warming of 2°C given 
UN-medium population, the mitigation effort pathway that yields peak warming of 3°C given 
UN-medium population, and so on. We also consider the mitigation effort pathway that yields the 
UN-medium Baseline scenario, where there is no climate mitigation.  
Therefore, for each of the five UN-medium scenarios, we determine the control rate at each time 
period that with the UN-low population would yield the same mitigation cost as a percentage of 
per capita GDP at each time and then run the model accordingly.  
Table S5 shows the difference in emissions between these five pairs of scenarios; again, each pair 
has the same mitigation effort pathway in the sense just described. Because there is by design 
almost no difference in mitigation cost as a percentage of per capita GDP, the savings implied by 
a lower population are here represented only by avoided climate damages in the further future.  
Such avoided climate damages are due to lower emissions, and the difference increases in 
magnitude as mitigation effort becomes less and less stringent.  
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Table S5. Avoided damages under UN-low rather than UN-medium population with 
a TU social objective given equal mitigation effort (for different mitigation effort 
pathways that yield different peak temperatures given UN-medium population). 
  Total change 
in emissions 
2020 2030 2040 2050 2150 2200 
2°C 
Per capita ($) 
-3% 
0 0 0 2 17 23 
Total ($billion) 0 0 4 14 98 119 
Change in emissions 0.2 0.7 1.2 0.9  -  - 
3°C 
Per capita ($) 
-11% 
0 0 1 3 216 274 
Total ($billion) 0 1 5 23 1,233 1,452 
Change in emissions 0.2 1.0 2.2 3.5  -  - 
4°C 
Per capita ($) 
-22% 
0 0 1 3 870 1,436 
Total ($billion) 0 1 6 24 4,973 7,608 
Change in emissions 0.2 1.0 2.3 3.9 5.6 0.0 
5°C 
Per capita ($) 
-31% 
0 0 1 3 1,314 3,342 
Total ($billion) 0 1 6 25 7,509 17,702 
Change in emissions 0.2 1.1 2.4 4.4 22.5 7.2 
Base 
Per capita ($) 
-37% 
0 0 1 4 2,275 6,945 
Total ($billion) 0 1 7 34 13,000 36,786 
Change in emissions 0.2 1.4 3.3 6.1 53.1 38.1 
 
 
  
Scovronick, et al. SI: Supplementary Information page 32 
Extension 4. Critical levels in the social welfare function 
Table 1 in the main text considers whether different population paths would represent overall 
improvements in wellbeing, as valued by the social welfare functions we use.  As described 
above and in the main text, our implementations of AU and TU are two focal functional forms, 
but other functional forms are also consistent with the basic principles of valuing, not valuing, or 
conditionally valuing additional lives or a larger population.  One alternative functional form 
within the general family of TU incorporates a “critical level”: a level of personal utility (in our 
case consumption,	𝑐, is the only input into utility, 𝑢(𝑐)) above which an additional life increases 
social welfare and below which it does not.  This form of totalist utilitarianism replaces [𝑢 𝑐 ∗𝑛] with [ 𝑢 𝑐 − 𝑢 𝑎 ∗ 𝑛] within each period, where 𝑎 is the critical level and 𝑛 is the 
population size (49). 
All totalist SWFs implicitly assume a critical level – if nothing is subtracted, a critical level of 
zero is assumed.  DICE’s default functional form implicitly assumes a critical level equal to a 
GDP per capita of $3,775 per year.  Therefore, if there were lives below this level of consumption, 
they would reduce social welfare; however, per capita GDP is greater than this level in every 
period in the model. 
Tables S6 and S7 analyze alternative critical levels in percentage and absolute terms, 
respectively.  As the critical level is reduced, the pattern is qualitatively the same as Table 1 of 
the main text: lowering population reduces total wellbeing. The effect is quantitatively dampened 
in percentage terms (Table S6) because the value of social welfare goes up when the critical level 
is reduced, but the absolute difference increases (Table S7). 
As a verification of our mechanism, we also include a case where the critical level is very high 
($10,000/year) – in our view, inappropriately high (because it implies that it makes the world 
worse for people to exist who have an income level comparable to the average citizen of Morocco 
or Ukraine, for example).  Here, a larger population is still preferable to a smaller one; even 
though additional lives are regarded as a social worsening over the coming several decades when 
global per capita GDP has not yet reached $10,000 per year, the cumulative total is higher over 
the model’s full time horizon. A critical level of $43,915 (roughly the current per capita GDP in 
the UK) is the point in DICE where the model has an equal amount of wellbeing whether 
assuming the UN-high or UN-low population. 
As a final note, optimal carbon taxes, emissions, and temperature change are all entirely 
independent of the choice of critical level.  This is a theoretical implication of the fact that that 
when population is exogenous (as in our model), the additive critical level term drops out of the 
first order condition for the optimum.  In other words, assuming a particular future population 
path, the optimal emissions reduction pathway and associated outcome for world is the same 
regardless of what assumption is made about the critical level – the choice of the critical level 
only affects how society should value that future world. 
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Table S6: Social valuation of population paths under several different TU critical levels at 
optimal climate policies, as a percent of the UN-medium path.  
Critical level ($/year) UN-high UN-medium UN-low 
$0.00  133.6% 100% 77.7% 
$730.50  144.0% 100% 71.1% 
$3,775.50 (DICE default value) 192.3% 100% 40.4% 
$10,000.00* -- -- -- 
* Total wellbeing is negative given a $10,000 critical level (Table S7), so we don’t report 
percentages for this scenario. 
 
 
Table S7: Social valuation of population paths under several different TU critical levels at 
optimal climate policies, in units of wellbeing (utility). 
 
Critical level ($/year) UN-high UN-medium UN-low 
$0.00  713,892 534,410 415,145 
$730.50  25,763 17,894 12,719 
$3,775.50 (DICE default value) 6,262 3,257 1,315 
$10,000.00  -63 -1,491 -2,384 
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